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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

LARRY DEAN TUCKEY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DEBRA A. TUCKEY (TREVIZO),
Case No. 17189
Defendant/Respondent,
FRANK TUCKEY and MARY TUCKEY,
husband and wife,
Intervenors/Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial
District Court, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
presiding.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
BRUCE PLENK
352 South Denver Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
PETER W. GUYON
820 Newhouse Building
#10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

LARRY DEAN TUCKEY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DEBRA A. TUCKEY (TREVIZO),
Case No. 17189
Defendant/Respondent,
FRANK TUCKEY and MARY TUCKEY,
husband and wife,
Intervenors/Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a custody dispute between the mother and
the paternal grandparents of two children born to Larry Dean
Tuckey and Debra A. Tuckey.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE TRIAL COURT
This matter was tried to the Third District Court,
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.

The Court maintained

custody of the children in the Defendant mother and denied
the petition of Intervenor grandparents.

Intervenors made
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a variety of post-trial motions which resulted in Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Judgment

awarding custody of the children to Defendant was not
altered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the District
Court's Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts the facts as set out in Appellant's Brief with the following exceptions.
1.

The Petition to Intervene of Frank and Mary

Tuckey was granted on February 15, 1979 as was Intervenors'
Motion for Temporary Custody of the minor children, the
Defendant indicating to the Court that she had no objection
since the Intervenors had told her she could have the children
back in her custody as soon as she was able to get back on
her feet.

R. 197.
2.

In addition to the evaluation of Intervenors

and the evaluation of Defendant performed by Ms. Denise
Taft, Mrs. Lela Patteson of the Vernal office of the Utah
Division of Family Services filed a report with the court
regarding the home conditions in Defendant's residence in
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Lapoint, Utah and indicated the house was clean and appropriate for the care of young children.
3.

R. 190-191.

Defendant has recently remarried and resides

in a mobile home at Lapoint, Utah, adjacent to the mobile
home of her mother and near other relatives who assist her
in the care of her children.
ARGUMENT I
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT
STANDARD IN AWARDING CUSTODY AND ITS
DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
This Court has established a stringent standard of
review in cases concerning child custody awards:
[T]he trial court is given particularly
broad discretion in the area of child
custody incident to separation or divorce
proceedings .... Only where the trial court
action is so flagrantly unjust as to
constitute an abuse of discretion should
the appellate forum interpose its own
judgment.
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-512

(Utah 1979).

Appellants have made no showing of any such abuse of discretion to justify reversal here.
There are two basic doctrines which courts have
used to decide custody disputes between the parent and third
parties - the ''parental right" doctrine, which ordinarily
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awards custody to the parent unless he or she is proven
unfit, and the "best interest of the child" doctrine, which
looks to the child's welfare regardless of any parental
rights.

However, in Utah, while the "best interests"

doctrine applies to custody disputes between a mother and a
father, it is clear that the "parental right" doctrine is
controlling in custody disputes between a parent and a third
party.
It is incorrect to say that either the parental
right or the best interest doctrine is the modern view, as
both doctrines are in widespread use.

It is also incorrect

to call either doctrine a better view, as the doctrines are
merely two ways to reach what would normally be the same
conclusion.

Even courts which apply the best interest

doctrine in cases such as this give great weight to the idea
that an important factor in determining the child's best
interest is the belief the child should normally be with its
parent rather than its grandparents.

Thus, even without

using a presumption, the courts give great weight to parental
rights under either theory.

See 29 ALR 3rd 366, 390-394.

In Utah the standard is usually expressed as a
presumption that the child's welfare will be best served in
the custody of its natural parent[s). This was the basis of
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the decision in Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97
(1946), where this court stated,

"we have repeatedly held

that there is a presumption that it will be in the best
interest and welfare of the child to be raised under the
care, custody and control of its natural parent.

Such a

presumption is recognized by most courts ... " and, at 102103:
We conclude that the determining consideration in cases of this kind is:
What will be for the best interest and
welfare of the child? That in determining
this question there is a presumption
that it would be for the best interest
and welfare of the child to be reared
under the care, custody and control of
its natural parent; that this presumption
is not overcome unless from all the
evidence the trier of facts is satisfied
that the welfare of the child requires
that it be awarded to someone other than
its natural parent.
Thus the ultimate
burden of proof on this question is always in favor of the parent and against
the other person. (emphasis added)
The same presumption is also recognized in Hardcastle
v. Hardcastle, 118 Utah 192, 221 P.2d 883

(1950), although

it was not applicable there because of a contrary finding
made by the divorce court awarding custody to the grandmother on an earlier occasion.

This is in contrast to the

present case in which the divorce court awarded custody to
the mother in the first instance.

Hardcastle is also
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instructive in connection with the burden of going forward
of each of the parties herein:
The mother is conceded to be a fit and
proper person to have the care and custody
of her child and unless her past conduct
brands her as unfit or forfeits her right
to claim her own flesh and blood, there is
no good reason why her opportunity to become
a real mother to her daughter should be
longer delayed.
221 P.2d at 889.
The application of the best interest test there is really
only a slight variation of the parental right analysis.
Given the facts of that case and the ultimate award of
custody to the mother, Defendant should certainly prevail
herein.
Over the years this court has recognized and given
great weight to the parental right presumption, culminating
in Coffman.

In Alley v. Alley, 67 Utah 316, 247 P. 301, 304

(1926), the court stated that it had "frequently made plain
that where the parent is morally a fit person to have the
care and custody of his own offspring, his rights are
paramount to all others."

(emphasis added)

In Wallick v.

Vance, 76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103, 108 (1930), the court
indicated that "the father as the surviving parent starts
with a very strong presumption in his favor."

This strong

parental preference has remained in effect to the present
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day.
1976).

See In Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah
In this entire line of cases, the parental pre-

ference was overcome only when the evidence showed that the
parent had abandoned or neglected the child, or forfeited or
surrendered custody.
Utah is by no means the only state which adopts
this view.

Although intervenors present a "survey" of

decisions purporting to use the best interest test, as many
recent cases from the same and other jurisdictions illustrate
the continuing vitality of the parental rights doctrine
across the nation.

For example, Nielsen v. Nielsen, 296

N.W.2d 483 (Neb. 1980) held that the courts may not deprive
a parent of its superior custody right unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is not fit to perform the
duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited that
right.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska went on to say that

the right of a parent to the custody of a minor child is not
lightly to be set aside in favor of more distant relatives
or unrelated parties.

This shows Nebraska enthusiastically

espousing a parental right theory, contrary to what Intervenors' brief would lead the court to believe.

In fact, the

Blanco v. Blanco case, 128 NW.2d 615 (Neb. 1964) cited by
Intervenors in suppo!t of a best interest test is incorrectly
cited.

In that case the mother was found to have forfeited

-7-
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her parental rights but the court used nearly identical
language in expressing the same parental rights doctrine
that it more recently recognized in Neilsen.

The court in

Blanco cited an even earlier case, Raymond v. Cotner, 175
Neb. 158, 120 N.W2d 892

(1963) as follows:

The courts may not properly deprive a
parent of the custody of a minor child
unless it is affirmatively shown that
such parent is unfit to perform the
duties imposed by the relationship or
has forfeited that right.
Nebraska seems to clearly adopt the parental right position.
In Lewis v. Lewis, 269 So.2d 919

(Ga. App. 1980),

the court held that in the contest between one or both
parents and a third party, unfitness must be shown by
evidence and found to exist before either parent can be
deprived of custody.

This position is also apparent in

Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512, 513-514

(Penn. 1980), where

the court said that the parent-child relationship should be
considered of importance in determining a suitable custody
arrangement because parents have a "prima facia right to
custody" which may be forfeited only if "convincing reasons
appear that the child's best interest will be served by an
award to the third party.

Thus, even before the proceedings

start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard to
the parent's side."
281 A.2d 129

The Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz case,

(Penn. 1971) cited in Intervenors' brief, seems
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more an application of a parental right doctrine than a
decision based on a strict best interest test in that state
as well.

Intervenors' complain that requiring them to prove

the natural mother unfit is too heavy a burden.

It is a

heavy burden, but in line with the overwhelming majority of
courts, this burden is rightfully on one who would disrupt
the family unit.
A New York court has recently added another
dimension to establishing the correct parameters of the
discussion here.

Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277

(NY

1976) recently held:
Neither decisional rule nor statute can
displace a fit parent because someone
else could do a 'better job' of raising
the child in the view of the court, so
long as the parent or parents have not
forfeited their rights by surrender,
abandonment, unfitness, persisting neglect
or other extraordinary circumstance ....
[E)xcept when disqualified or displaced
by extraordinary circumstances, parents
are generally best qualified to care for
their own children and therefore entitled
to do so.
Indeed the courts and the law
would, under existing constitutional principles, be powerless to supplant parents except
for grievous cause or necessity.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651

(1972).

Over and over again, our courts have emphasized the existence
and constitutional dimension of the parents' primary legal
rights to their child.· A number of United States Supreme
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Court cases, including Stanley, have discussed such rights
as marriage, establishing a home, and rearing children as
fundamental rights to be accorded the greatest sanctity.
The prevailing rule then, in a custody dispute
between a third party and a parent, is that the parent will
prevail unless clearly shown to be unfit, and there is a
presumption that he or she is fit.
stated it this way.

A law journal author

"Thus, in custody cases between persons

with legal rights in the child, the best interests of the
child prevail, which ordinarily amounts to a choice between
them unless one or both is unfit.

In custody disputes

between a parent and a third party, it might be said either
that the presumption of fitness of the parent is stronger or
that the best interest of the child will weigh less heavily,
which is the other side of the coin."
347 at 356-358

(1962).

39 U of Detroit L.J.

As shown above, this is clearly the

position taken by this court in the past.

The decision

reached by the trial court is a correct application of
previous case law and should be upheld.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE SUFFICIENT AND SHOULD
BE UPHELD.
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Appellants point to four alleged deficiencies in
the trial court's findings and conclusions.

In their ob-

jections Intervenors confuse their position as argued with
the court's findings.

The two are simply not the same.

First, the Court removed a proposed reference to an initial
evaluation performed by Ms. Denise Taft.

Since the court

did not base its conclusions or judgment on Ms. Taft's
testimony, the fact that she gave testimony and made a
contrary recommendation is not a material factual issue
which must be resolved by the findings.

The court is

obliged to make findings only on such issues.
Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980).

Sorenson v.

While Finding No. 6

is somewhat ambiguous as to what "thereon" refers to, the
ambiguity is not a sufficient basis for reversal or remand.
Likewise with Intervenors' second objection, to
deleting Ms. Taft's supplemental recommendation.

Again the

material facts do not include what Ms. Taft recommended, but
rather the factual basis for the judge's decision which is
supported by other findings.

In custody proceedings the

trial court has the discretion to disregard the testimony of
an expert, since such testimony is in no manner controlling
on the court.

Mecham v. Mecham, 544 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah

197 5).

-11-
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Intervenors' third objection is to Finding No. 9.
The report of Ms. Lela Patteson, DFS worker from Vernal,
which was adopted by stipulation and referred to by the
court at R.239, contains the source information about both
the job market in Vernal and the details of the land purchase.
Finally, Conclusion of Law Nos. 1 and 2 properly
state the rule in Utah that parents are entitled to a presumption of fitness for custody of their children as against
third parties unless the challenger can present evidence to
overcome this rebuttable presumption.
failed to do.

This the Intervenors

The Conclusions correctly reflect the state

of the law in this state (See Point I above) and the trial
court's conclusions regarding the circumstances before him.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT.
As cited above, in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, this
court recently reaffirmed a long line of cases extending
broad discretion to the lower court in child custody cases
since any decision in this area of law is, of necessity,
based on a difficult and to some extent subjective evaluation of conflicting evidence as to future behavior of adults
toward children.

In this case there was a great deal of

conflicting testimony regarding the behavior of various

-12-
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adults and even of the children themselves and who was or
was not responsible for those behaviors and even whether it
was better to live in the city or the country (R. 228) or to
use Indian or more traditional Anglo-American child rearing
techniques

(R. 218).
After hearing from both parents and both grand-

mothers, the trial court elected to maintain custody with
the mother who had been awarded custody in the divorce
proceeding some years earlier.

The court querried the

children's father as to Respondent's ability to care for and
discipline the children before the divorce.

He testified

she was able to properly care for the children (R. 224-5) .
Similarly a state-employed Social Services worker, Ms. Lela
Patteson, visited Respondent's home and found it to be
adequately sized and furnished

(R. 239)

and Respondent and

her husband able to meet the financial needs of the children.
Appellants have selected bits and pieces of evidence,
primarily self-serving, to claim that the weight of evidence
supports a custody award to them.

However, the fairer

reading of the evidence supports a conclusion that the
evidence is split and in conflict and it was within the
discretion of the court.to find that Respondent should
retain custody.

If anything the evidence shows that Re-

spondent has had difficulties in her life and has recently
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begun to get back on her feet with the assistance of her
mother and husband.

Certainly receiving assistance from

one's family is not a basis for losing custody of one's
children.
CONCLUSION
The trial court acted within its discretion in
maintaining custody with Respondent.

The legal standard

used was correct, there is competent evidence among the
conflicting evidence to support the court's decision and it
should be upheld.
DATED this

/2.,1],_ day of January, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Respondent

BRUCE PLENK
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